The Uniformity of Nature
The Uniformity of Nature
Argument
Scientific induction presupposes that nature is sufficiently uniform for past regularities to be informative about future occurrences. This presupposition is not itself deliverable by science without circularity. Any attempted empirical justification of induction uses inductive reasoning to validate induction.
That does not make induction irrational, but it does show that science rests on a meta-commitment that is philosophical rather than experimentally derived. Atheism typically treats the intelligibility and stability of nature as a given. Theism offers a principled account: a rational Creator sustains an ordered world compatible with rational inquiry.
Even if an atheist can propose alternative accounts, the challenge remains: on strict naturalism, why should a contingent universe be governed by stable, discoverable regularities that map onto human rational capacities? The uniformity of nature is not merely a scientific finding; it is a precondition of the scientific project.
Formal Argument
P1. Induction is rational only if nature is sufficiently uniform such that future unobserved cases are projectable from past observed cases.
P2. Induction cannot be justified by induction without circularity; any such attempt presupposes the very uniformity in dispute.
P3. Atheistic naturalism, which treats laws and initial conditions as contingent and unguided, provides no principled reason why uniformity should obtain rather than fail.
P4. If a worldview cannot supply a principled ground for uniformity, then it cannot justify induction; it can only assume it.
C1. Therefore, atheistic naturalism cannot rationally justify the scientific method it relies upon; it must take induction on faith.
P5. Theism grounds uniformity in a rational sustainer who orders and preserves creation.
C2. Therefore, theism provides the only non-circular basis for the uniformity required by science, whereas atheistic naturalism undercuts science’s rational foundation.
Analogy
Imagine a company that approves every loan using a scoring algorithm. When regulators ask how the company knows the algorithm is reliable, the company responds: “Because the algorithm says it is reliable.” That response is circular: it presupposes precisely what is in dispute.
Induction operates differently and is widely unavoidable, but the structural issue is similar. If the only justification for expecting future regularities is “it has worked before,” then the justification already assumes a stable connection between past and future. Any worldview that takes pride in scientific rationality still needs an account of why such projectability is rational to expect.