Moral Obligation vs Moral Description

Atheistic accounts often do reasonably well describing how moral sentiments arise through evolutionary pressures, social learning, or cultural norms. But the central theistic claim is not merely that humans have moral feelings; it is that moral obligations are binding, and that some actions are wrong regardless of preference or consensus.

The is–ought gap does not disappear because one offers a causal genealogy of moral belief. Explaining how moral beliefs emerge does not explain why those beliefs obligate. A complete moral ontology must account for normativity itself, not merely moral psychology.

If duties are genuinely authoritative, then they require a ground capable of conferring authority. Impersonal facts about biology or social advantage can explain why we believe certain things are wrong, but they do not by themselves generate the claim “you are obligated.”

Theism proposes a personal moral ground capable of underwriting genuine obligation. Even if an atheist adopts moral realism, the deeper question remains: what gives moral truths their authoritative “oughtness” over agents rather than functioning as inert facts?

Formal Argument

P1. Moral obligations are normative claims that purport to be authoritative over agents (binding “oughts”).

P2. Merely descriptive facts (biological, psychological, sociological) do not, by themselves, entail authoritative normativity.

C1. Therefore, a purely descriptive naturalistic account is insufficient to ground moral obligation.

P3. If objective moral obligations exist, there must be an ontological ground adequate to their authority.

C2. Therefore, if objective obligations exist, naturalism is explanatorily inadequate and a personal moral ground is a plausible candidate.

Analogy

A manual can describe how a machine operates and predict how it will behave under stress. But the manual cannot create a duty in the machine to behave differently. Description can yield prediction; it cannot yield obligation.

Likewise, an evolutionary account may explain why cooperation is widespread or why certain taboos enhance group stability, but it does not explain why a person is obligated to tell the truth when lying would benefit them and they can escape consequences.

Obligation is not the same kind of thing as behavioral conditioning; it is a claim of normative authority over the agent.