The Problem of Objective Morality
The Problem of Objective Morality
Epistemologically, a universe consisting solely of atoms and void has no space for “good” or “evil.” Science can describe what is (biology, physics), but it cannot dictate what ought to be.
In a godless world, morality can be nothing more than a social contract, a personal preference, or an evolutionary instinct for cooperation. It cannot be objective truth (truth that is binding on all people, at all times, regardless of their opinion).
If a lion kills a gazelle, we do not call it “murder”; we call it lunch. If a materialist worldview is true, humans are merely sophisticated animals.
Therefore, when one human kills another, it is simply a rearrangement of atoms. The atheist may personally dislike it, but they cannot say it is “wrong” in any cosmic sense.
To call genocide “evil” in an atheistic universe is factually equivalent to saying “I don’t like broccoli.” It is a statement of taste, not truth.
Formal Argument
P1. If objective moral obligations exist, they are categorical duties binding regardless of preference, power, or social consensus.
P2. Purely descriptive natural facts (biology, psychology, sociology) can explain moral behavior and sentiments, but they cannot generate categorical normativity (binding “oughts”).
P3. Therefore, if categorical moral obligations exist, their ground must be beyond merely descriptive natural facts.
P4. Categorical moral obligation requires an objectively authoritative source capable of issuing binding norms; impersonal contingent facts lack such authority.
P5. Objective moral obligations exist.
C1. Therefore, an objectively authoritative moral ground exists.
P6. Atheistic naturalism affirms only impersonal, contingent natural facts as ultimate reality.
P7. An objectively authoritative moral ground cannot be reduced to impersonal, contingent natural facts.
C2. Therefore, atheistic naturalism is false or explanatorily incomplete, and a personal moral ground (best accounted for by theism) is required to make objective moral obligation intelligible.
Analogy
In a godless world, the statement “I hate genocide” is factually identical to the statement “I hate broccoli.” Both are simply biochemical reactions in the brain expressing a preference.
Analogy
Consider a society debating whether slavery is wrong. If one group says, “Slavery is wrong because it violates human dignity,” while another says, “Slavery is fine because it benefits us,” there is no way to resolve the dispute if morality is merely preference.
Moral condemnation only has force if it refers to a standard beyond personal or cultural opinion. Without such a standard, moral disagreement collapses into power struggles, not truth claims.