The Redefinition of Atheism

The first sign of weakness in the modern atheist movement is its refusal to define its own terms with integrity. For centuries, in the halls of serious philosophy, “atheism” was understood as the positive assertion that “God does not exist.” This is a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, and like any truth claim, it bears a burden of proof.

However, recognizing the difficulty of proving a universal negative, modern atheists have retreated into “weak atheism,” redefining their position as a “mere lack of belief” in gods. This definition shifts atheism from a philosophical position to a psychological report of one’s own mental state.

This maneuver is a debating tactic known as the Motte-and-Bailey Fallacy. The atheist retreats to the modest, easily defensible position of “I just lack belief” when challenged to provide evidence, while continuing in practice to advance strong metaphysical claims that God is a delusion, religion is harmful, and material reality is all that exists.

This redefinition also results in a reductio ad absurdum. If atheism is merely a “lack of belief,” then rocks, shoes, vegetables, and infants qualify as atheists. By expanding the definition to include non-cognitive entities, the term is rendered philosophically meaningless in order to evade the responsibility of defense.

Formal Argument

P1. A worldview-position, strictly speaking, is an explanatory stance that includes one or more propositional commitments about reality.

P2. Defining atheism as “mere lack of belief in God” specifies only a doxastic state and does not, by itself, specify any explanatory propositional commitments about reality.

P3. A stance that specifies only a doxastic state, without further propositional commitments, is insufficient to constitute a worldview-position.

C1. Therefore, “mere lack of belief” atheism, by itself, is not a worldview-position, though it may accompany one.

P4. Terms used to classify persons by belief presuppose a subject capable of beliefs.

P5. Entities that lack the capacity for belief-formation are not appropriate subjects of belief-ascriptions.

C2. Therefore, the term “atheist” must be restricted to cognitive agents or it becomes category-mistaken and unhelpful.

P6. If a person publicly argues for metaphysical conclusions commonly associated with atheism, they are asserting propositions about reality rather than merely reporting a lack of belief.

C3. Therefore, when atheists advance metaphysical theses beyond “lack of belief,” they incur the ordinary burden of defending those claims.

Analogy

Imagine a prosecutor in a murder trial who, when asked to present evidence for the defendant’s guilt, replies, “I don’t have to prove he’s guilty; I merely lack the belief that he is innocent.”

Such a response would be immediately dismissed. One cannot prevail in argument or judgment by refusing to adopt a position while simultaneously acting as though one has. A case requires claims, and claims require defense.